Intentional Torts by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 49 
Number 3 Volume 49, Spring 1975, Number 3 Article 22 
August 2012 
Intentional Torts 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1975) "Intentional Torts," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 49 : No. 3 , Article 22. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol49/iss3/22 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Intentional torts
Recent changes to Article 14 of the CPLR concerning contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors880 have raised speculation as to the ap-
plicability of Dole apportionments to the area of intentional torts. 81
Historically, one of the primary purposes in denying contribution
among tortfeasors was to deter willful misconduct.8 2 The bar on
contribution stood as a warning to tortfeasors that the injured party
could recover his total judgment against any one of them, with no
recourse by the chosen defendant against his fellow tortfeasors.-an The
harshness of this rule was mitigated somewhat by the development of
the active-passive distinction in indemnification suits. Under this
doctrine, the liability of a vicariously liable tortfeasor is shifted totally
to the actual wrongdoer s8 4 Under the former CPLR 1401,885 pro rata
contribution among defendants was made permissible where the
plaintiff joined more than one defendant in the action. More recently,
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 886 introduced the concept of allocating
damages among joint negligent tortfeasors according to their relative
culpability.88 7
880 CPLR 1401 now provides in part that
two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same per-
sonal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among
them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been ren-
dered against the person from whom contribution is sought.
881 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 1401, supp. commentary at 184 (1974), wherein Dean
Joseph M. McLaughlin notes that "nothing in the statute [CPLR 1401 as amended] bars
contribution between intentional tortfeasors." See also Murphy, Dole v. Dow Chemical,
Thoughts About the Future, N.Y.S.B. Ass'N J. INs. NE. & CoMP. SECrioN, Fall 1972, at 17,
20-21 [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
882 See W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs 305 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
See generally Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortleasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
130 (1932). The common law rule against contribution had its origin in Merryweather v.
Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Dean Prosser concludes that the rationale under-
lying the Merryweather decision was that a party who acted intentionally and in
concert with another could not rest a claim for contribution "upon what was, in the eyes
of the law, entirely his own deliberate wrong." PROSSER at 305. Early New York cases
adopted the rule against contribution where willful misconduct was present. Id. at 306 &
n.45, citing Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige Ch. 18 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1844); Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns.
Ch. 130 (N.Y. 1816).
888 See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019, commentary at 296-97 (1974). See also 2A WK&M
1401.04.
884 See PROSSER, supra note 382, at 310-11.
885 Ch. 388, § 5, [1964] N.Y. Laws 1256, repealed, ch. 742, § 1, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1153
(McKinney). Under the new CPLR 1401, there is no requirement that the plaintiff join
all defendants in the action, before a claim for contribution will lie. Moreover, contribu-
tion is to be computed according to relative culpability rather than pro rata apportion-
ment. See note 380 supra.
888 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
887 Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. In Dole, the Court of Appeals
stated that the right to an apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors should
depend upon their "relative responsibility" for the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Id. It
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Subsequent decisions considering the applicability of Dole to
intentional misconduct have not been uniform in result.888 In Goswami
v. H & D Construction Co, 5 9 the Supreme Court, Steuben County,
was faced with the novel question of whether the Dole principle
should be extended to an action for trespass. Plaintiff commenced
separate trespass and nuisance actions against H & D Construction Co.
and the City of Hornell. The suit against the defendant construction
company was the result of its entry upon plaintiff's land, pursuant to
a contract with the city, to reconstruct a municipally owned thorough-
fare. Plaintiff proceeded against the city on the theory that the defend-
ant construction company was the city's agent when it entered plain-
tiff's property. Thereafter, the defendant contractor commenced a
third-party action seeking contribution from the defendant city in the
event that plaintiff obtained a judgment against it. Justice Wightman,
in granting the city's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, held that intentional tortfeasors were
not entitled to seek Dole apportionments.390 In the court's view, the
Dole rule applies only to suits against tortfeasors charged with
negligence. 91
should be observed that the Dole Court never reached the issue of the application of the
contribution doctrine to intentional tortfeasors. Rather, it restricted its holding to joint
tortfeasors "causing damage by negligence." 30 N.Y.2d at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331
N.Y.S.2d at 391.
888 Compare Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), and Slotkin v. Brookdae Hosp. Center, 377 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
with Goswami v. H & D Constr. Co., 78 Misc. 2d 99, 355 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. Steuben
County 1974).
Professor David D. Siegel has stated that although the traditional bar to contribution
among joint tortfeasors continues to have some validity in the area of intentional torts,
it may be appropriate to discard that principle and permit contribution in such cases.
7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019, commentary at 297 (1974). Through the inclusion of inten-
tional torts within the Dole rule, Professor Siegel foresees two positive results. First,
considerations of deterrence and punishment would reside solely with the criminal law.
Id. Presumably, the advantage to be gained by such a shift in responsibility stems from
the belief that the criminal law, traditionally concerned with willful misbehavior, is the
appropriate instrument to deal with deterrence of intentional misconduct, whether it bejoint or individual. Second, it would eliminate the difficulty often encountered in deter-
mining whether the conduct complained of was intentional or not. Id.
Another commentator, Dean John J. Murphy, has suggested that since joint tort-
feasors who are responsible for an intentional tort need not be equally culpable, it would
be appropriate to extend Dole to suits based upon intentional torts. Murphy, supra note
381, at 20-21. Moreover, he argues that juries could determine, without undue difficulty,
the relative culpability of joint tortfeasors in suits arising from intentional torts. Id.
889 78 Misc. 2d 99, 355 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1974).
890 Id. at 102, 355 N.YS.2d at 926.
391 Id. In reaching its holding, the court stated:
It is the opinion of this court that the rationale of the Dow Chemical ruling is
limited to cases where apportionment of responsibility between negligent joint
or concurrent tort feasors is to be determined. In the instant case the wrongs
alleged . . . are of an intentional nature for which each of the defendants is
1975]
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In contrast to the Goswami holding, two recent decisions in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
have concluded that the Dole rule should be extended to intentional
torts. The first of these cases, Slotkin v. Brookdale Hospital Center,892
involved a fraud action wherein plaintiffs alleged that as a result of
the misrepresentations of the defendant insurance carriers as to the
coverage of the defendant hospital's liability insurance policy, they
were induced to settle their malpractice action against the hospital. In
addition to the hospital and insurance carriers, named as defendants
were several executive officers of the hospital and representatives of the
insurance carriers. Two of the individual defendants moved to amend
their answers to include cross-claims for indemnification against the
hospital, characterizing themselves as mere conduits of information
supplied by the hospital. The defendant hospital opposed the motion,
arguing that in New York there is no right to contribution in a fraud
action. 93 Rejecting this contention, the district court permitted the
defendants to enter cross-claims against the hospital.3 94 Citing the
expansion of Dole into areas other than ordinary negligence,395 Judge
Connor concluded that there was no plausible reason to deny the ap-
plication of Dole to suits based upon intentional misconduct.3 96 In
so holding, the court noted that two New York commentators, Pro-
fessor David D. Siegel and Dean John J. Murphy, had suggested such
an extension of Dole.3 97
In another decision by the Southern District, Herzfeld v. Laven-
thol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,8 98 two purchasers of securities
jointly answerable and upon which no legal basis for indemnity . ..has been
asserted.
Id.
392 377 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
393 Although the court did not indicate what cases the defendant hospital relied upon
to support its contention, it did characterize the authorities cited by the hospital as "no
longer good law," in light of Dole. Id. at 278.
394 Id. at 280.
895 Id. at 279, citing Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl A. Morse, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 1,
315 N.E2d 751, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1974) (statutory liability); Langer v. Eschwege, 39 App.
Div. 2d 653, 332 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1972) (attorney malpractice); Walsh v. Ford Motor
Co., 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (breach of implied
warranty).
396 377 F. Supp. at 279-80. In its opinion, the court stated that "the applicability of
the Dole doctrine to intentional torts has not been considered by the New York courts ......
Id. at 279. Apparently, the court was unaware of the decision one month earlier in
Goswami v. H & D Constr. Co., 78 Misc. 2d 99, 355 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County
1974).
397 377 F. Supp. at 279-80, citing 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, commentary at 297
(1974); Murphy, supra note 381, at 17, 20-21. See generally note 381 supra.
398 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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brought a fraud action, based upon both federal and state law, against
the defendant accounting firm. 99 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
had misrepresented data contained in financial reports that it had
prepared for the issuer of the securities, a Delaware corporation in-
volved in real estate syndications. Thereafter, defendant commenced
a third-party action against an investment banking firm and one of the
firm's officers, charging that the third-party defendants had exaggerated
the value of the issuer's property in communications with it. Judge
MacMahon held that the defendant accounting firm was entitled to
contribution from the investment firm. 400 The court deemed this result
necessary, in order that "the deterrent effect of the judgment [would]
be felt by all culpable parties. '40 1 Unfortunately, the court devoted
little of its attention to the contribution issue. More particularly, it
failed to explore the possible distinctions, for the purpose of permit-
ting the relative allocation of fault among joint tortfeasors, between
negligence suits and actions based upon intentional misconduct.402
While it remains to be seen how the courts will interpret the
recent revisions to Article 14, the better approach would appear to
favor its application to actions based upon intentional misconduct.
The revisions merely reflect a codification of the Dole principle,4 03
and Slotkin and Herzfeld offer the practitioner support for the con-
clusion that Dole applies to intentional as well as negligent torts. More-
over, the Judicial Conference Report accompanying the changes ex-
pressly points out that "[t]he section is not limited to unintentional
390 Suit was brought under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974);
the New York Blue Sky Law, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-c (McKinney 1968); and the
common law. 378 F. Supp. at 117.
400 378 F. Supp. at 135-36. However, the Southern District held that the proper
measure of contribution would be pro rata sharing, rather than relative allocation of
fault. The court concluded that under the facts of the case, pro rata contribution would
be simpler and more expedient to calculate. Id. at 136. In addition, the third-party cfaim
against the officer of the accounting firm was dismissed by the court. Id. at 133.
401 The third-party defendant was found liable under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970), rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1974), and common law fraud. 378 F. Supp. 130-35.
402 Apparently, the Herzfeld court would permit contribution whether a suit is based
upon negligence or intentional misconduct. See 378 F. Supp. at 130-36. Before the Herzfeld
decision, a Dole claim based upon the breach of a statutory duty had been permitted by
the Appellate Division, First Department, in Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl A. Morse,
42 App. Div. 2d 891, 347 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Ist Dep't 1973) (mem.), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 1, 315
N.E.2d 751, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1974). The court did not cite this case in its opinion.
Moreover, Goswami, decided one month before Herzfeld, was not mentioned in the
Herzfeld decision, presumably because the court was unaware of its existence.
403 TWvr ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDIcIAL CoNFERENcE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE
CPLR, appearing in 2 N.Y. SEss. LAws 1803 (McKinney 1974).
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tortfeasors." 404 The Conference Report suggested that since contribu-
tion between active intentional tortfeasors joined in an action was not
prohibited under the former CPLR 1401, there is no absolute policy
bar to contribution in the area of intentional torts.405 Accordingly, it
would seem that there is no justifiable reason for limiting contribu-
tion to unintentional torts.
Retroactivity
The Court of Appeals, in Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co.,400
extended the applicability of Dole to any litigation pending on the
date of that decision.40 7 As a result of the subsequent liberal inter-
pretation of Kelly by lower courts, defendants have asserted their
rights to a Dole apportionment at various stages of litigation.40 8 Even
where the main action was tried pre-Dole and no claim for apportion-
ment was asserted until the appellate level, courts have deemed such
cases still pending and have remanded them for apportionment of
damages among joint tortfeasors. 409
404Id. at 1806.
405 Id. The report acknowledged that the Revised Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act does not permit contribution among intentional tortfeasors, but found
unpersuasive the reasons offered therein for such a prohibition. Id., citing UNiFoam CON-
TIBUTION AMON( TORTFEASORS A-r § l(c) & Comment (rev. 1955).
406 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
407 Kelly involved an appeal by an active tortfeasor from the dismissal of his cross-
complaint. Between the time of the original dismissal and the appeal, Dole was decided.
The Court of Appeals reinstated the cross-complaint, stating, "We, of course, . ..give
effect to the law as it exists at the time of our decision." Id. at 29 n.3, 286 N.E.2d at 243
n.3, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854 n.3. See also Rodgers v. Dorchester Associates, 32 N.Y.2d 553,
300 N.E.2d 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1973); Frey v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 764, 284
N.E.2d 579, 333 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1972).
408 For a discussion of Dole's application to pending cases, see 3 WK&M $ 3019.62;
Tymann & Samore, Torts, in 1973 Survey of New York Law, 25 SYRACusE L. Rv. 433,
433-34 (1974); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent Developments, 48 ST. JoHN's L.
Rav. 195, 202-03 (1973); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent Developments, 47 ST.
JOHN'S L. Ry . 759-60 (1973).
.409 See Stein v. Whitehead, 40 App. Div. 2d 89, 92, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (2d Dep't
1972), wherein the appellate court, in an action commenced prior to Dole, noted that
"even in the absence of a cross-claim I think the trial court should, sua sponte, charge
the jury that it should determine the proportionate responsibility of each defendant .. "
Similarly, in Brown v. City of New York, 40 App. Div. 2d 785, 337 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1st Dep't
1972), the First Department apportioned damages among joint tortfeasors despite a prior
pre-Dole dismissal of the third-party complaint. In Liebman v. County of Westchester
41 App. Div. 2d 756, 341 N.Y.S.2d 567 (2d Dep't 1973), the court, in granting apportion-
ment, noted that the plaintiff's recovery would be temporarily delayed but considered
this to be of minor significance as compared with the predominant consideration of "fair-
ness in the judicial management of the case." Id. at 757, 341 N.YS.2d at 570, quoting
Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 NXE.2d 288, 295, 331 N.YS.2d 382, 391
(1972). Absent apportionment, the possibility of prejudice can be far greater to the joint
tortfeasors.
However, the Court of Appeals, in Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E2d 622,
345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 202 (1973), refused
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